In Australia, the market abuse prohibition is generally well accepted by the investing and non-investing public as well as by the government. This co-operative and coordinated approach on the part of all the relevant stakeholders has to date given rise to an increased awareness and commendable combating of market abuse activities in the Australian corporations, companies and securities markets. It is against this background that this article seeks to explore the general enforcement approaches that are employed to combat market abuse (insider trading and market manipulation) activity in Australia. In relation to this, the role of selected enforcement authorities and possible enforcement methods which may be learnt from the Australian experience will be isolated where necessary for consideration in the South African market abuse regulatory framework.
Introduction
In Australia, the market abuse prohibition1 is generally well accepted by the investing and non-investing public as well as by the government.2 This co-operative and co-ordinated approach on the part of all the relevant stakeholders has to date given rise to an increased awareness and commendable combating of market abuse activities in the Australian corporations, companies and securities markets.3 It is against this background that this article seeks to comparatively explore the general enforcement approaches that are employed to combat market abuse (insider trading and market manipulation) activity in Australia4 and South Africa. In relation to this, the role of selected enforcement authorities and possible enforcement methods which may be learnt from both the Australian and South African experiences will be isolated and Investments Commission (ASIC) on 1 July 1998.8 As a result, apart from its main responsibility to oversee the regulation of companies and the futures markets, the ASIC assumed further responsibilities.9 For instance, the ASIC may investigate any criminal matters involving insider trading and market manipulation and prosecute such matters in terms of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act10 and the Corporations Act.11 The ASIC may further refer any serious criminal matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth DPP) for prosecution in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between itself and the Commonwealth DPP.12 Therefore, the ASIC may, after investigations and liaising with the Commonwealth DPP, institute criminal proceedings against any person accused of violating any market misconduct provisions, especially where it reasonably suspects that such violation actually occurred.13 Eventually, if such person is convicted, the ASIC and/or the courts may impose a maximum criminal fine of Aus $495, 000, or three times the profit gained or loss avoided, whichever is the greater, or ten years imprisonment or both, for individuals. The maximum criminal penalties for a body corporate were increased to a fine of Aus $4, 950, 000, or three times the profit made or loss avoided, or ten per cent of the body corporate's annual turnover during the relevant period in which the offence was committed, whichever is greater.14 However, relatively few successful prosecutions were obtained in criminal cases for market manipulation in Australia during the period from 1990 to 2011.15 Furthermore, the ASIC may commence civil proceedings against any person who engages in market abuse activities.16 Accordingly, the ASIC may in the public interest bring an action in the name of and for the benefit of the body corporate to recover its losses, pecuniary damages, property or other entitlements as contemplated in the Corporations Act.17 Therefore, the ASIC may institute a civil action for insider trading and/or other related offences without the consent of the affected persons or the issuer of the affected securities or financial products.18 Moreover, the ASIC may bring civil penalty proceedings and impose civil penalties of up to Aus $200 000 for individuals and Aus $1 million for corporations that contravene its Rules and/or indulge in illicit market abuse practices.19 The ASIC is further empowered to apply for a compensation order on behalf of any person who was affected by market abuse practices.20 Additionally, the ASIC may seek court orders such as restraint, investment, mandatory direction and cancellation orders to ensure timely compensation for the victims of insider trading21 and/or other related market abuse activities and is further empowered to apply for a civil penalty by way of a pecuniary penalty. A pecuniary penalty is a penalty imposed only after a declaration of contravention of a financial services penalty provision has been proved in a court of law.22 In relation to this, the ASIC may seek a court order for a declaration of contravention of market abuse provisions in Australia.23 It is nonetheless submitted that the ASIC has grappled to obtain more successful settlements in civil proceedings involving market manipulation.24 Moreover, the ASIC has powers to disqualify any person convicted of committing market abuse offences from his managerial position in any corporation.25 Regarding this, the ASIC may impose an order against the offenders restricting, stopping or banning them from providing any financial services or exercising any voting or other rights attached to financial products,26 or issuing,27 acquiring or disposing of such financial products.28 In relation this, the ASIC has so far managed to impose relatively more banning orders against the market abuse offenders.29 The ASIC may also suspend or cancel the offenders' Australian Financial Service Licences and/or impose varying conditions on such Licences. As earlier stated,30 the ASIC may further seek court orders for the freezing of assets or injunctions against the offenders.31 The ASIC may also take disciplinary action which inter alia includes the cancellation of an agreement for the acquisition or disposal of financial products or imposing an order directing a person to do or refrain from doing a specified conduct.32 23 The ASIC has additional powers to search and seize any proceeds in relation to any benefits that may result from market abuse activities in Australia.33 Therefore, the ASIC may issue notices to the accused persons in order to inspect their premises and, after obtaining a search warrant, to compel such persons to appear before it for the purposes of answering questions and/or providing it with any other relevant information.34 Additionally, the ASIC has powers to investigate any market abuse violations. Like other enforcement agencies such as the Federal Police, the State and territory, the ASIC may collect statements and evidence from the available witnesses. The ASIC can further request any relevant person to give it reasonable assistance in relation to an ongoing investigation and/or any subsequent prosecution.35 Most recently, the ASIC's investigatory powers were significantly increased.36 Accordingly, the ASIC will no longer be required to issue a notice before applying to a magistrate for a search warrant.37 This will reduce the risk of the accused persons destroying market abuse evidential material before the search warrant is obtained.38 Furthermore, market manipulation and insider trading offences are now listed as serious offences under the Telecommunications Act,39 thereby empowering the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and/or other interception agencies40 to apply for a telephone interception warrant in matters involving market abuse investigations. This is aimed at granting the ASIC an opportunity 33 R v Hannes (2002) to work with the AFP to obtain intercepted telephone material which could be used in the prosecution of market abuse offences.41
The ASIC is now responsible for the real-time surveillance of the Australian securities and futures markets to detect and prevent market abuse activities.42 This suggests that the ASIC's Market Surveillance Team now uses the same surveillance system which was initially used by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX)'s Surveillance Department.43 Moreover, the ASIC's Market Surveillance Team is also made up of a number of former employees of the ASX's Surveillance Department with extensive market experience.44 Consequently, the ASIC may further detect market abuse activities from the surveillance it undertakes, complaints from the public, media and the assistance it receives from other enforcement agencies like the ASX.45 It is hoped that the delays which used to inhibit the ASIC's investigations and preliminary enquiries into the ASX's market abuse referrals will now be removed.46
In addition, the ASIC is also responsible for maintaining confidence of investors in securities markets and futures markets by obtaining orders that direct the disposal of financial products or vests such products under its control to ensure adequate protection of such investors,47 for the purpose of enhancing It is anticipated that many market abuse offenders will elect to comply with the ASIC's infringement notices and/or enforceable undertakings rather than the costly civil penalty proceedings.58 It is also expected that the ASIC will develop adequate technological mechanisms for cross-market surveillance to detect and combat market abuse practices across different markets in Australia.59 Although the role of the ASIC as a corporate watchdog against market abuse practices has been criticised by some commentators for being relatively ineffective,60 a considerable number of persons have to date been investigated and prosecuted for various market abuse offences as a result of the functioning of the ASIC and the relevant courts in Australia.61 In other words, the ASIC has played and continues to play a significant role in the entire enforcement of securities laws and the market abuse prohibition in Australia It is evident that, in spite of the relatively few market abuse settlements and convictions obtained by the ASIC in the late 1990s,63 the ASIC has in recent years successfully increased its settlements and prosecutions of market abuse cases in Australia. This has been attributed to several factors which include, inter alia, the ASIC's ability to devote more resources specifically to deal with the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in Australia.64 This may further indicate that the ASIC takes the enforcement of market abuse as one of its top priorities.65 For example, the ASIC operates a system for the Electronic Document Lodgment. This system enables lodgment agents such as accountants, lawyers and brokers to transfer relevant documents promptly to the ASIC electronically and free of charge in order to effect disclosure of inside information. Therefore, although the ASIC could still be facing some challenges in relation to the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in the bull markets and hedge funds,66 one can conclude that the ASIC enforcement has to date significantly reduced market abuse activity in the Australian financial markets. data92 from any suspected offenders in matters involving market abuse investigations in South Africa under the Financial Markets Act. It is submitted that this flaw should be adequately addressed in the near future to avoid possible anti-market abuse enforcement challenges such as the current paucity of, and/ or delays associated with the market abuse cases that have been prosecuted or settled with the FSB in South Africa to date.93 With regard to this, apart from solely imposing the main responsibility of enforcing the market abuse prohibition on the FSB, enacting a statutory private right of action for the issuers of securities or the affected persons should be seriously considered to improve the curbing of market abuse activities in South Africa.94
Comparative Evaluation and Analysis

2.2
The Role of the ASX facsimile to the ASX from any place in Australia at a reasonably cheap cost. This service was introduced to encourage companies to comply with prompt disclosure requirements of any inside information that relates to securities or financial products in Australia. Another service offered by the ASX is the Stock Exchange Automated Training System (SEATS) which was established in 1987 and became fully operative in 1990.111 Its main role is to enable the ASX member organisations with recognised orders to buy and sell securities or financial products that are traded on a market conducted by the ASX. It also provides its member organisations with adequate information pertaining to securities or financial markets trading such as any changes in the market. This avoids the abuse of non-public price-sensitive information relating to the financial products by any person who might have access to such information.112 Furthermore, in order to complement and supplement the SEATS, the Clearing House Electronic Sub-register System was put in place in September 1994 by the Australian Stock Exchange Settlement and Transfer Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the ASX, for expedient electronic settlement in Australia of share transfers of both domestic and foreign issuers. 113 Probably, one of the major services offered by the ASX is its assistance in electronic market surveillance, which is inter alia employed to investigate and detect market abuse practices. This electronic surveillance has been utilised by the ASX as early as the 1990s to detect any incidences of market abuse practices in the Australian financial markets.114 Notably, the ASX's detection and investigation functions were vested in the ASX Market Supervision Private Limited.115 The surveillance is usually done by way of monitoring market activity and 111 See the ASX Annual Report (1996) trading patterns through a computerised and sophisticated system called the SOMA. Moreover, the SOMA system is programmed to detect abnormal trading sequences by looking at the electronic signal of the SEATS which contains the details of trading and some programmed parameters in order to alert persons such as financial analysts for consideration. For example, specific transactions conducted in relation to a nominated security can be isolated and analysed by the SEATS as regards to the time, offer, bids, sales and purchases. The SOMA system will then compare the electronic signal containing all the details of trading against a series of parameters. These parameters are programmed to ignore normal trading activity but to record and report any abnormal or irregular trading activity immediately when such parameters are violated.116 Thereafter, such transactions will be discussed with the broker or representative concerned and coded for historical sequencing.117 This enables the ASX to assess and monitor price movements and share trading volumes, through matching the representative's coded transaction number with the transaction contracts held by brokers, to identify the affected clients.118 In some instances, these trading alerts were admissible as evidence against the perpetrators of market abuse offences.119 In the recent years, the Securities Market Automated Research Trading and Surveillance system has been successfully employed to monitor all real-time trading information and highlights unusual trading patterns and volume movements in order to detect market abuse activity in Australia.120 Moreover, the ASX has the power, especially where a suspected trading has been detected, to refer such matters to the ASIC in accordance with their MOU.121 Specifically, any such referrals are directly transferred to the Market Watch Division of the ASIC for more investigation and preliminary analysis. If the Market Watch Division is satisfied that some market abuse offences were committed, then the matter will be passed on to the Enforcement Division of the ASIC, which will eventually commence with the legal proceedings against the offenders concerned.122 Notably, these surveillance systems are now operated by the ASIC to execute its duties in relation to the real-time surveillance of the Australian securities and financial markets.123 Put differently, Australia used to impose the responsibility to enforce the market abuse ban squarely on the ASIC as a government national regulator and the ASX as an independent self-regulatory organisation.124 Consequently, the ASX played a key role in the real-time monitoring of market participants and the surveillance of market abuse activities in the Australian securities and financial markets.125 Nonetheless, these powers have now been transferred to the ASIC.126
Comparative Evaluation and Analysis
On the other hand, unlike the Australian approach discussed above,127 it appears that the FSB is not statutorily and expressly empowered to take over the real-time surveillance of the South African securities and financial markets,128 to intercept telephonic data from the suspected market abuse offenders and to develop its own technological mechanisms for market abuse cross-market surveillance for the purposes of combating market abuse activities in such markets under the Financial Markets Act.129 In relation to this, it is important to note that the JSE bears the responsibility to operate the Stock Exchange in South Africa.130 Additionally, like the ASX,131 the JSE is involved in the general regulation and enforcement of securities laws in South Africa in order to prevent, among other things, the occurrence of market abuse and/or other illicit trading activities in the relevant regulated financial markets.132 Moreover, although the Financial Markets Act does not expressly provide whether the JSE is statutorily obliged to give reasonable assistance to the FSB, the JSE has, however, played a very significant role in the detection, investigation and prevention of market abuse practices in South Africa to date.133 Therefore, like the ASX,134 the JSE is primarily responsible for the promotion of market integrity and market fairness in the South African financial markets and companies. Nevertheless, unlike the position in Australia,135 the JSE (not the FSB) is responsible for the real-time monitoring of market participants and the surveillance of market abuse activities in the South Africa financial Markets. 136 In relation to this, the JSE's Surveillance Division is reportedly equipped with sophisticated proprietary surveillance systems that are designed to detect abnormal movements and trading volumes which usually point to market abuse activity.137 These surveillance systems are controlled by the Market Practices Department and the Surveillance Division138 of the JSE and are reportedly capable of isolating the names, addresses, telephone numbers and other details of the parties involved in the affected transactions.139 Consequently, unlike the current position in Australia,140 where suspicious or irregular trading activity is detected in South Africa, the JSE's Surveillance Division may contact the affected persons or refer such matters to the DMA for further investigation.141 Nonetheless, in contrast to the position in Australia,142 there seems to be no statutory or formal binding MOU that has been brokered between the FSB and the JSE regarding the detection and referral of suspected market abuse practices in South Africa. 143 It is submitted that South Africa should adopt the Australian approach144 and introduce a statutory or formal binding MOU between the JSE and the FSB in order to enhance the detection and combating of market abuse practices in South Africa. It is further hoped that the responsibility for the realtime monitoring of market participants and the surveillance of the South African financial markets will be moved from the JSE to the FSB to eradicate the delays which usually hamper the FSB's investigations into the JSE's market abuse referrals. Like the ASX,145 the JSE has also developed its own Listing Requirements aimed at preventing market abuse activities. For example, the JSE requires all the listed companies to disclose promptly any price-sensitive information relating to the listed securities.146 This general obligation of disclosure on the part of the issuers of securities is commonly utilised through the JSE's Securities Exchange News Service to curb and prevent insider trading in South Africa.147 Nevertheless, in contrast to the ASX,148 the JSE does not seem to have its own Disciplinary Tribunal which specifically deals with any violations of its Listing Requirements and/or market abuse cases in South Africa.149 As a result, apart from some disciplinary action such as suspension, 140 The ASIC no longer rely on the ASX's referrals to detect market abuse activities in the Australian securities markets. termination of operating licences and stopping or delaying the trading of the offender's securities on the JSE, the JSE does not seem to have the statutory authority to impose fixed or specified disciplinary monetary fines on such offenders. In this regard, the JSE's enforcement powers appear to be more restricted than those of the ASX.150 Moreover, unlike the position in Australia,151 the JSE is not statutorily empowered to search the premises of the accused persons who are suspected of engaging in market abuse practices and/or to summon any such persons to furnish it with other relevant information relating to ongoing market abuse cases.
2.3
The Role of Other Self-Regulatory Organisations For the purposes of this sub-heading, the self-regulatory organisations (SROs) include the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee (CAMAC), the International Banks and Securities Association of Australia (IBSA), the Securities and Derivatives Industry Association (SADIA), the Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) and the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD). Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is not an SRO per se, but an independent body that oversees the enforcement of competition and consumer-related laws in Australia, its functions will be carefully discussed under this sub-heading. In other words, although this article is more focused on securities and financial markets, the ACCC is discussed here to explore its role in relation to the combating of market abuse-related practices involving trades in goods and services in Australia.
The CAMAC has also contributed significantly to the general regulation and enforcement of the securities laws in Australia.152 Specifically, the CAMAC was established in terms of Part 9 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 as an advisory body to the government, which is responsible for monitoring the occurrence of illicit trading activities and the enforcement of market abuse provisions in Australia. Some commentators agree that the CAMAC has to date made a number of useful proposals for the reform of the Australian market abuse regulatory framework.153 Moreover, the CAMAC has to date managed to consistently participate in the reviewing of market abuse laws, especially with regard to insider trading, and has on a number of occasions formulated proposals for reforms aimed at promoting investor confidence and the integrity of the Australian securities and futures markets.154 In addition, the CAMAC has, to a fair extent, managed to isolate potentially serious flaws that are sometimes embedded in the securities legislation and recommended possible solutions to combat market abuse practices in Australia to date.155 Put differently, the CAMAC may make recommendations on any matter relating to the operation or administration of the corporations or securities legislation, or companies or a segment of the financial products and financial services industry, or law reform with regard to the corporations or securities legislation and/or proposals for improving the efficiency of the financial markets in Australia.156
The ACCC is equally involved in the regulation of the securities legislation and the enforcement of the anti-market abuse prohibition in Australia.157 For example, the ACCC was empowered under the Trade Practices Act158 to intercept all electronic communications based on a suspicious trading which could be as a result of market manipulation or insider trading. Notably, similar functions are now provided under the Competition and Consumer Act159 which repealed and replaced the Trade Practices Act. Additionally, the ACCC prohibits the formulation of cartels by discouraging contracts, arrangements or understandings which have the effect or are likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition or containing an exclusionary provision.160 As a result, the ACCC may impose civil pecuniary penalties of up to Aus $10 million per contravention on corporations and Aus $500 000 per contravention on individuals (or company executives) who indulge in cartels.161 In 2006, a new regime of criminal sanctions was introduced to enable the ACCC to curb serious cartel conduct and market abuse activities.162 In addition, the ACCC has further concluded a MOU with the Commonwealth DPP to seek criminal prosecutions and jail terms for individuals who systematically engage in the violation of market misconduct provisions or who misled it in relation to its market abuse investigations.163 Additionally, the IBSA has to date formulated some business rules and guidelines that do not only represent the interests of merchant and investment banks in Australia, but that have also played a crucial role in dispute resolution.164 The IBSA has further managed to promote and protect the interest of its members in Australia and other foreign-owned institutions. Moreover, the IBSA rules and guidelines require all its member organisations to ensure that their employees acknowledge in writing that they are aware of such rules or guidelines and that they are not going to violate the market misconduct provisions and/or engage in transactions involving conflicts of interests. The IBSA guidelines also require the member organisations to summarise the relevant statutory provisions and examples of situations which highlight an alert of any contravention of the market misconduct provisions (especially insider trading).165 The IBSA guidelines stipulate that price-sensitive information which is in the possession of an employee should only be given to the other employees in the normal course of executing their professional duties. In addition, the IBSA guidelines recommend the physical separation of the underwriting and corporate advisory developments as well as the employees from other member organisations.166 This could have aimed at discouraging insider trading and market manipulation. Moreover, the IBSA guidelines require its member companies to develop and maintain lists of embargoed or restricted securities in which employees or any persons related to them cannot deal in or encourage other clients to deal in, until the stipulated embargo is lifted.167
The SADIA has further contributed significantly to the securities regulation in Australia, especially with regard to conflict resolution.168 For example, the SADIA has developed its best practice guidelines regarding research integrity, which among other things, encourage both the securities industry and the financial services industry to promote a culture of self-compliance in order to reduce as much as possible the occurrence of conflicts of interests. Although the SADIA guidelines are neither a comprehensive prescription nor a mandatory method for combating conflicts of interests, they provide useful ways of enforcing Chinese walls and the general combating of market abuse activities in Australia. For instance, the SADIA guidelines include measures for encouraging its member organisations to put the interests of the investors first by engaging in independent and objective research and/or financial advice and establishing specific and separate reporting structures to ensure that analysts 165 report only to the head of research and not to the corporate or trading units for approval.169 Such guidelines also encourage member organisations to have Chinese walls to prevent the improper dissemination of price-sensitive information. Additionally, the SADIA guidelines encourage member organisations to discourage market abuse by implementing a written statement of a corporation's policies and procedures for managing conflicts of interests, restricting trading by analysts in the subject of research during the research or for a reasonable period after its completion or from trading in a manner inconsistent with the research in question and/or by monitoring the public's compliance with a corporation's policies and procedures.170
The AFMA and the AICD have additionally played a key role in the regulation and enforcement of securities legislation in Australia. They have specifically formulated various guidelines for the persons involved in the securities business such as brokers and other market participants like financial analysts. Particularly, the AICD has devised certain rules and guidelines to promote market integrity and investor confidence by discouraging corporation directors from abusing their office or price-sensitive information to engage inter alia in market abuse activities. Likewise, the AICD has some rules and regulations that prohibit any person from engaging in market manipulation, especially with regard to the transactions that are conducted privately or bilaterally on the over the counter financial markets and on the Australian offshore licenced markets.171 In other words, the AFMA regulates the over the counter financial markets and ensures that the parties to the over the counter transactions include terms in their contracts which prohibit the misuse of material nonpublic price-sensitive information. In addition, the AFMA has further positively contributed to the review and reform of various securities and financial laws in Australia. and the ASX,174 the JSE does not seem to have the powers to impose monetary pecuniary penalties against the market abuse offenders in South Africa. 175 It is therefore hoped, as is the position in Australia,176 that the Takeover Regulation Panel (the TRP) and the JSE will continue to participate more in matters regarding the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.177 However, like the CAMAC,178 the DMA has the powers to advise and perform some investigatory functions on the behalf of the FSB.179 Nevertheless, unlike the CAMAC,180 the DMA is not statutorily authorised to make recommendations to the South African legislature on matters regarding the securities law reform, operation of securities and financial markets and the general regulation of such markets.181 Moreover, in contrast to the CAMAC,182 the DMA is yet to engage more in the public consultation and making of proposals to the legislature and/or other relevant authorities regarding the general regulation and enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.
Moreover, unlike the ASX,183 it is uncertain whether the EC has the powers to take an administrative action like suspending or banning the market abuse offenders from managing any company for a stipulated period in South Africa. 184 In addition, in contrast to the ASX,185 the EC does not seem to have additional powers to summon any suspected offenders to produce evidence or documents necessary for any particular ongoing market abuse case trial or to search any premises or persons who are suspected to have such documents.186 Furthermore, unlike the SROs in Australia,187 as already stated above, the SROs in South Africa seem to have restricted authority, especially with regard to the making of their own market abuse rules,188 decisions, regulations and other appropriate disciplinary or administrative actions on matters involving market abuse offences.189 In relation to this, it is hoped, as is the position in Australia, 190 that more SROs will be statutorily empowered and introduced in South Africa in the near future to complement the FSB's efforts to combat market abuse activities.
2.4
The Role of the Courts The Commonwealth DPP and the courts have a crucial role in the enforcement of the securities and market abuse legislation in Australia.191 Therefore, all the competent courts192 have inherent powers to impose sanctions on any person who contravenes insider trading and/or other market misconduct provisions in Australia.193 These powers include the making of: (a) orders restraining any accused persons from exercising rights attached to Division 3 financial products, (b) orders to restrain the acquisition, issue or disposal of such products, (c) orders for the vesting of such products in the ASIC and/or to direct the disposal of such products, or (d) orders for the cancellation of the Australian financial services licences. 194 The competent courts in Australia further have powers to make orders that direct any person to do or refrain from doing specified acts, for the purposes of ensuring compliance with any other order they may make in this regard. 195 Additionally, the competent courts in Australia have the discretion to make a declaration of contravention of the market manipulation and/or other market misconduct provisions, particularly when they are certain that such contravention actually occurred.196 In relation to this, the Australian courts advocates that market abuse practices should be regulated and outlawed at all costs in order to maintain open and transparent financial markets which promote investor confidence and market integrity. 197 Moreover, the success achieved by the Australian courts in relation to the effective enforcement of the market abuse provisions is clearly reflected in the number of reported settlements and prosecutions achieved in both civil and criminal cases to date. 198 The Australian courts have in fact been commended for radically achieving more settlements and prosecutions in relation to market abuse cases, particularly with regard to insider trading.199 They do not rely on circumstantial evidence to impute liability on the accused persons, but they nonetheless take cognisance of other relevant factors, such as the actual abuse of material non-public price-sensitive inside information by an insider or any other person for personal benefit or for the benefit of another. 200 The Australian courts have further provided useful interpretation and guidelines regarding the enforcement of some key market abuse provisions. For example, in the Firns case,201 the Court of Appeal held that information was readily observable if it was disseminated to a financial market in Australia as stipulated in the Corporations Act.202 Additionally, the Australian courts have also managed, in some instances, to provide meaningful recommendations regarding the enforcement of penalties, remedies and other related actions against the market abuse offenders.203 Precisely, the Australian courts advise the ASIC and other relevant authorities regarding whether a criminal as opposed to civil action should be instituted against any market abuse offenders in question. 204 As highlighted above, the Commonwealth DPP and the relevant courts have also contributed immensely to the market abuse enforcement in Australia. For example, the courts may, upon the request from the ASIC, the Commonwealth as a result of an informational advantage which he usually has at the expense of the shareholder(s) concerned and consequently, such director would have committed insider trading if he dealt in the shares in question on the basis of the price-sensitive information which he had; also see Brunninghausen case (1999) 46 NSWLR 538 at 549; Glavanics v Brunninghausen (1996) 14 ACLC 345 at 549, where the plaintiff's reliance on the breach of a fiduciary duty was overturned by the Court of Appeal and in essence acquitting the defendant of all the charges that were brought against him, namely fraud, engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct, negligence and breach of a fiduciary duty. DPP or the affected persons, grant orders for compensation, injunctive relief, restitution orders, seize and desist orders, banning orders, freezing orders and other appropriate sanctions against the offenders in Australia.205 Moreover, the courts have helped the ASIC to interpret certain key principles regarding market abuse prohibition in Australia. This has in a way helped to increase the number of market abuse prosecutions which are executed by both the courts and the ASIC in Australia. Additionally, the Supreme Courts and the Courts of Appeal have quite usefully provided their support to the ASX, the ASX Disciplinary Tribunal and the AAT to resolve market abuse related appeals from the aggrieved persons.
2.4.1 Comparative Evaluation and Analysis Like the position in Australia,206 competent courts in South Africa have the powers to hear market abuse cases and the discretion to impose appropriate sanctions and penalties against the market abuse offenders. 207 In particular, such discretionary powers usually relates to the actual amount of the fines to be imposed on the market abuse offenders and the nature of proceedings (that is civil, criminal or administrative proceedings) to be instituted against such offenders.208 However, other commentators209 have alluded to the fact that the paucity of settlements and prosecutions of market abuse cases in South Africa could have been ameliorated if the legislature had not rigidly adopted some of the American contemporaneous principles,210 especially with regard to the insider trading prohibition. In addition, it is submitted that the legislature should consider statutorily engaging additional regulatory agencies and empowering more specialised courts that deal with market abuse offences in South Africa. In line with this, it is hoped that relevant aspects of the Australian approach211 will be adopted in South Africa to empower the competent courts to have the discretion to make a declaration of contravention of the market abuse provisions whenever they are certain that such contravention actually occurred in order to increase deterrence on the part of the offenders.
3
Concluding Remarks
The article has revealed that the enforcement authorities in both Australia and South Africa have to date contributed significantly to the combating of market abuse in their respective jurisdictions. However, it is submitted that more may still need to be done to increase the timeous criminal prosecution of market abuse cases in both Australia and South Africa. Consequently, the relevant stakeholders in South Africa and Australia should be encouraged to consider some of the recommendations below.
Recommendations
It is suggested that the ASIC should carefully utilise its powers to obtain intercepted telephone material which could be used in the prosecution of market abuse offences without unlawfully encroaching on the alleged offenders' rights to privacy and dignity. It is further submitted that South Africa should consider following the developments in Australia and empowering the FSB to develop its own adequate technological mechanisms for market abuse cross-market surveillance, in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets in South Africa. This could enable the FSB to detect, investigate and prevent market abuse practices in South Africa effectively and timeoulsy by eradicating the delays that might be associated with the FSB's investigations into the JSE's market abuse referrals. It is also suggested that the FSB should be statutorily empowered (like the ASIC) to enable it to make a declaration of contravention of market abuse provisions and/or to seek a court order for such declaration in South Africa whenever such contravention occurs, for deterrence purposes.
